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The alleged threats to human nature are at the root of many concerns about the 
use of nanotechnology to extend human health and capabilities. Bu the concept 
of human nature is illusory, selectively deployed, and does not impose any 
ethical constraint on human enhancement. Human nature is not only a 
meaningless concept, a product of our imperfect human cognition and a relic of 
the idea of a "soul," but, as it is deployed today against human enhancement 
technologies, it is also a morally offensive, racist concept. The "human-racists" 
who deploy the concept of human nature are more inclusive than their forebears, 
but the make the same mistake of tying citizenship and value to biology. By 
setting aside the concept of human nature, we can affirm the value of the myriad 
aspects of human existence that we wish to preserve and extend using human 
enhancement technologies, including whatever genetic capacities and limits we 
may discover.  Human enhancement technologies, such as those that may be 
enabled by nanotechnology and genetic engineering, enable us to define a new 
and more dynamic set of human capabilities, and to better achieve many moral 
virtues, regardless of whether they are part of "human nature" or not. 
 
Nanotechnology Threatens Humanness? 
 
Critics of the speculative future uses of nanotechnology sometimes suggest that there is some 
kind of "humanness" or "human dignity" threatened by nanotechnological enhancement. For 
instance in his theologically-informed review of nanotechnology's promise C. Christopher Hook 
notes: 
 
It is one thing to use technology to repair an injury or to treat or heal an affliction, but it 
is quite another thing to use technology to engineer "better" human beings. Many who are 
healthy will likely be tempted to "enhance" themselves in various ways via cybernetics or 
to increase their longevity via nanotechnology. (Hook, 2002) 
 
The British Christian thinktank opines  
 
(Nanotechnology) has potentially dark sides to it. Repairing an injury or treating an 
illness is one thing, enhancing or engineering a ‘better’ human being is another… 
Unethical restoration is that which seeks to enhance, alter or improve the original design. 
The underlying question here could simply be: ‘what is this technology doing to human 
dignity?’ (Taylor, 2003) 
 
Where does this anxiety about protecting humanness from nanotechnology comes from?  
 
Unhelpful Ontological Concreteness in Human Cognition 
 
One of the few things that may be unique to homo sapiens sapiens among all animals is our  
facility for creating abstract concepts, and one of the earliest abstract concepts was probably the 
idea that there are spirits in the human body, in animals and in things. This hypothesis of the 
abstract ontological unity and continuity of bearness, mountainness, or the human soul was a 
natural extension of the human self-awareness, the illusion of a unity and continuity in self-
identity (Dennett, 1992; Boyer, 2001; Dennett, 1992). This attribution of an abstract ontology to 
things has its uses, as it allows us to make predictions about how creatures and things of a kind 
will behave (Dennett, 1987). The belief that others have an inner self similar to our inner self is 
the root of empathy.  But these vitalist illusions can also trap us into positing identities that do not 
exist, of making inaccurate predictions, and persisting with dysfunctional and limiting beliefs.  
 
Human nature is one such limiting, dysfunctional, illusory and inaccurate belief, the inadequacy 
of which is revealed in the debates over the moral uses of human enhancement technologies.  
Take for instance Leon Kass's grounding of his opposition to human enhancement in the 
existence of Platonic ideal types, including a unitary and inviolate human nature:  
 
"(Creatures) have their given species-specified natures: they are each and all of a given 
sort. Cockroaches and humans are equally bestowed but differently natured. To turn a 
man into a cockroach…would be dehumanizing. To try to turn a man into more than a 
man might be so as well….We need a particular regard and respect for the special gift 
that is our own given nature." (Kass, 2003) 
 
Without ever clearly defining what this human nature is, Kass deploys the concept to both 
separate us from our continuity with other animals, and bar any improvement in our condition.  
When exactly does a man's evolution into cockroach violate his human nature? Is it the loss of a 
skeleton, the growth of the carapace, the hairy legs, or the compound eyes? Can I have tiny 
antennae, but not big ones? Are is it simply the obsessive compulsive fixation on the scent of 
food and avoiding light?  When does man become dehumanized in becoming more than man?  
 
Few proponents of a distinctive and unitary human nature or soul attempt to answer these 
questions because they do not have a clear definition of human nature to begin with.  They can't 
specify when hominids got human nature or a soul, or which specific transhuman modifications 
would rob us of this vitalist essence. They can't agree which aspects of the mind and behavior are 
part of the soul or human nature, and which are unnatural, or how parts of human nature might 
also be shared by other animals. Only after we have deconstructed their illusory theory of a 
human nature, can we begin a serious discussion of the qualities of the human condition worth 
preserving. 
 
Human Nature has no Clear Definition 
 
One clear problem with the idea of human nature is that, despite thousands of years of 
investigation, and intimate access to the subject of investigation, there is no agreement about what 
human nature is. Are we innately good, compassionate, altruistic, or evil, sinful, and selfish?  Is 
moral striving a liberation of our true human nature from sinful influences or capitalism, or is 
moral behavior a persistent struggle of the good in human nature against its dark side?  Or are we 
a blank slate, morally and behaviorally, or inscribed with all our personality traits, and even 
beliefs, at birth?  Some writers identify human nature with the apparently distinctive human 
capacities for cognition, language, tool-use, and the creation of meaning and categories, while 
others include physiology that we share with other species, such as mortality, limbically-mediated 
emotions, and our genetic predispositions for altruism and aggression.  
 
Cognitive neuroscience, ethology and evolutionary psychology are attempting to specify the exact 
structure and epidemiology of human cognitive traits, and clarify which capacities and impulses 
are genetically innate and which are plastic or learned. These efforts continue to generate 
enormous insight, but they have also given some succor to advocates of human nature and natural 
law, even though these sciences simultaneously challenge the traditional understandings of free 
will, personal identity, and human exceptionalism. Nonetheless, the re-reification of human 
nature by some evolutionary psychologists has led them to echo Kass' pessimism about human 
enhancement. Leading evolutionary psychologist Stephen Pinker says for instance: 
 
"After decades of exile, the concept of human nature is back. It has been rehabilitated 
both by scientific findings that the mind has a universal, genetically shaped organization, 
and by philosophical analyses that have dispelled the fear that the concept is morally and 
politically tainted. So if human nature exists, can it be changed? Attempts to redesign 
human nature … are generally recognized as futile, dangerous, and unnecessary to 
achieve moral and political progress." (Pinker, 2003) 
 
This powerful desire to re-construct the Ought on the genetic Is gives us reason to question the 
claim that evolutionary psychology has revealed a unitary and universal human nature.  In 
Adapting Minds, David Buller's (2005) careful deconstruction of evolutionary psychology, he 
argues that the field has generated little evidence that human beings have specific genetically 
driven modules adapted for Pleistocene existence. Rather, Buller believes the distinctive 
achievement of human evolution was the development of general cognitive plasticity, a dynamic 
adaptive intelligence which has allowed humans to invent, and re-invent ourselves.  
 
Of course it is true that there are myriad genetic, hormonal and physiological features that shape 
our desires, thoughts and behavior, and some of which we share with most other human beings. 
But this constellation of influences fails as a theory of human nature on both analytical and 
normative grounds. It fails analytically because it posits a vague constellation of species-typical 
traits which had no clear beginning, are not actually species-specific, and are not clearly 
threatened by any specific enhancement. Normatively the argument fails because we are not 
morally bound by our genes. 
 
 
Human Nature No Clear Beginning and No Clear Boundary With Other Species 
 
There is no clear beginning for human nature or the human species. There was, we can assume, 
no day when all our hominid precursors gave birth to modern humans with opposable thumbs, 
hidden estrus, upright posture, language ability, abstract cognition and tool-use. These traits may 
have emerged abruptly in evolutionary time, but the periods were still tens or hundreds of 
thousand of years. Which of grandmothers or grandfathers would the defenders of human nature 
determine finally had "it", and were not just savage beasts like their parents? Our branch of the 
evolutionary tree shows continuous change, right up through the last fifteen thousand years 
(Philips, 2006; Voight, 2006). Without specifying which traits confer membership in humanity it 
is not clear whether our genetic differences from Pleistocene humans mean we share human 
nature with them or not.  Did the recently discovered tool-using "hobbits" of Indonesia, homo 
florensis, have human nature? 
 
Similarly, we share with primates almost all the qualities that allegedly make us special: self-
awareness, culture, language, and tool-use. No, they aren't good at abstract reasoning or grammar, 
but then neither are small children, the demented or the developmentally delayed, and yet they 
apparently have human nature.  
 
Accepting that the things we value and attribute to human nature are actually shared continuously 
with non-human ancestors and contemporaneous species is not a devaluation of those traits, or of 
humanity. In fact it is only by affirming the value of reason, language, compassion and culture-
making that we can build an ethical framework to guide human enhancement technologies. 
 
 
Human Nature Has No Clear Ending  
 
Without a clear definition of human nature, or specification of the things of value, the opponents 
of human enhancement technology flounder in defining which enhancements cross the line. 
Francis Fukuyama and the President's Council on Bioethics see the line being crossed with 
Ritalin, anti-depressants, anti-trauma drugs and preimplantation genetic diagnosis, while others 
focus further along on the advent of superintelligent immortals and human-animal hybrids. As 
David Reardon, an anti-abortion activist who is promoting an amendment to the Missouri 
constitution to forbid human genetic engineering, cloning and transhumanism, has said: 
 
"Any ethic that fails to (1) define human nature, and (2) assign some value to protecting 
human nature, inherently lacks the ability to find any limits on the justifications that can 
be offered to alter or destroy human nature, human beings, or humanity." (Reardon, 
2005) 
 
Reardon is, of course, completely wrong. Although human nature is being deployed to stop 
enhancement, the vague and chimerical concept provides no clear lines and policy conclusions. It 
is only when we let go of the notion of a unitary and inviolate human nature that we can turn to 
the challenge of delineating which features of embodied human existence are so important that 
we want to preserve them from technological modification, and which are so central that we want 
to encourage their enhancement and further evolution.  
 
 
Human Nature is not Normative 
 
Even if we do have some clear set of evolved traits that were distinctively human, they are not 
normatively binding on us (Bayertz, 2003). To the extent that we are born with impulses for 
aggression, racism or selfishness, or limits on our capacity for wisdom, awe or compassionate 
action, we may in fact be morally obliged to modify human nature (Savulescu, 2005). 
 
The boldest and most interesting defense of the naturalistic fallacy of a moral imperative of 
human nature comes from Francis Fukuyama. Fukuyama argues that human rights and social 
solidarity are grounded in a shared human nature. Any effort to tinker with human nature will 
erode social solidarity and lead to totalitarianism. But he explicitly refuses to define human 
nature, calling it simply "Factor X." 
 
"Factor X cannot be reduced to the possession of moral choice, or reason, or language, or 
sociability, or sentience, or emotions, or consciousness, or any other quality that has been 
put forth as a ground for human dignity. It is all these qualities coming together in a 
human whole that make up factor X." 
 
This argument for human nature as an ineffable gestalt is very convenient. If human nature were 
the sum of these features rather than their irreducible whole, then they might be individually 
improved, and human nature with them. If human nature was self-awareness, empathy and the 
ability for abstract thought, for instance, then a green-skinned, four-armed transgenic could still 
be part of the Jeffersonian polity, and a superior citizen if she was smarter and more empathic.  
 
But Fukuyama's Factor X is also a unique argument that the diversity of humanity must stay 
within its existing standard deviations from the mean of human traits. This allows Fukuyama to 
answer the challenge that a normative human nature excludes some existing humans who don't fit 
this ideal typical model, such as the disabled. Variation in intelligence, longevity or morphology 
are OK, so long as we stay within our existing parameters of variation. Although our social unity 
can apparently still encompass conjoined twins, amputees, people born with fur or tails, and the 
developmentally delayed, mentally ill and extremely smart, too many kids on Ritalin or too many 
130 year-olds would apparently break the bell curved social contract.  
 
But if people four feet tall can feel solidarity with people seven feet tall, why can't the average 
person be six feet tall instead of five and a half? Why would everyone enjoying the happiness or 
intelligence experienced by the luckiest 1% of the population fracture humanity into racial 
subgroups? Certainly, the sudden adoption by a minority of superintelligence, immortality and 
uploading would challenge existing understandings of shared citizenship, just as shared 
citizenship had to be forged across racial differences in the past. But human enhancement 
technologies pose no challenge to Fukuyama's normative standard deviation if all members of a 
society become more intelligent, long-lived and beautiful, and gradually move the bell curve to 
the right.  
 
For Fukuyama and the other bioconservatives this blurring of the line between ur-humans and 
post-humans is even more horrifying than the emergence of an entirely separate posthuman 
species. Since all good flows from the people of our race having pure Factor X, and race pride in 
the goodness of our shared Factor X, it must be protected from the complexities of a multi-racial 
society and even more from race-mixing contamination.  
 
The Inescapable Racism of the Human Nature Concept 
 
The use of the concept of human nature today is, we see, inescapably racist, human-racist, with 
the same consequences for tyranny, violence and suppression of human diversity as the ideology 
of European racism before it. The human-racists are more inclusive racists than their forebears, 
but racists nonetheless in their effort to ground solidarity in biological characteristics instead of 
shared recognition that another being has self-awareness, feelings and thoughts like our own. We 
hear in the panicked demands to ban the mixing of human and animal DNA striking echoes of the 
demands to protect the purity of the white race from mongrelization. The root of this racialist 
anxiety was laid bare in Mary Douglas' work (1966); it is the taboo on the violation of categories, 
the ritual taboos against blurring of lines between male and female, white and black, animal and 
man, and man and the gods.  
 
In fact, Yuval Levin, a staffer on President's Council on Bioethics, explicitly embraced Douglas' 
analysis as the mission of "conservative bioethics" in the inaugural issue of the bioconservative 
journal New Atlantis. The goal of conservative bioethics, he says, is to defend the taboos which  
 
….stand guard at the border crossings between the realm of the properly human and those 
of the beasts and the gods. When the boundaries are breached, when degradation or 
hubris is given expression, our stomachs recoil. (Levin, 2003) 
 
This alleged self-evident repugnance is the same rationale for bans on race-mixing given by all 
racialists. 
 
The irony is that human-racism is being promoted by some progressives precisely as a means to 
unify humanity through "species consciousness," just as white American identity was used to 
meld together Poles, Irish and Italians, and pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism was promoted to 
transcend nationalism and tribalism.   
 
The doctrine of a unifying human nature has also become an unquestioned assumption in human 
rights discourse. For instance the United Nations Universal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1998) says  
 
“The human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human 
family, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity.” 
 
As with bans on miscegenation, human-racists demand bans on human enhancement technologies 
in order to protect the purity of the human race. President Bush called for a ban on human-animal 
hybrids in his 2006 State of the Union message, and Missouri has become the first US state to 
consider a ban on human-animal hybrids, cloning, human-genetic modification and 
transhumanism. Bioethicists George Annas and Lori Andrews have been working with an 
international network of opponents of human enhancement towards an international treaty to 
make human genetic modification a “crime against humanity." Genetic enhancement, they say,  
 
“can alter the essence of humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of 
human rights) by taking human evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the 
development of a new species, sometimes termed the ‘posthuman.’...Membership in the 
human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights.” (Annas, 
Andres and Isasi, 2002).   
 
Again, like the white supremacists, Annas justifies the suppression of posthumanity on the 
grounds that they are destined to engage in race war to enslave or exterminate the pure humans: 
 
"The posthuman will come to see us (the garden variety human) as an inferior subspecies 
without human rights to be enslaved or slaughtered preemptively. It is this potential for 
genocide based on genetic difference, that I have termed "genetic genocide," that makes 
species-altering genetic engineering a potential weapon of mass destruction." (Annas, 
2001) 
 
The Violent Potential of the Human Racists 
 
Is it mere hyperbole to point to the similarity between the race war apocalypticism of the white 
supremacists and the species-extermination apocalypticism the bioconservatives? Unfortunately 
not. Beyond the violence that would be done to human life, longevity and well-being by attempts 
to ban any modification of our chimerical human nature, there is the actual violence that 
apocalyptic human-racism has already generated, and will generate. Theodore Kaczynski, aka 
"the Unabomber," waged a bombing campaign for eighteen years in the United States against 
scientists engaged in projects that he thought threatened human nature, principally through 
cybernetics and genetic engineering. 
 
"Human nature has in the past put certain limits on the development of societies. People 
could be pushed only so far and no farther. But today this may be changing, because 
modern technology is developing way of modifying human beings…. getting rid of 
industrial society will accomplish a great deal. It will relieve the worst of the pressure on 
nature so that the scars can begin to heal. It will remove the capacity of organized society 
to keep increasing its control over nature (including human nature)" (Kaczynski, 1995)  
 
Bombers of abortion clinics are also soldiers in the human-racist effort. In the embryo rights 
belief system all bearers of the human genome have equal moral worth, just as only bearers of 
this human genome have worth.  The Christian Right's "Manifesto on Biotechnology and Human 
Dignity," which calls for a ban on human genetic modification, makes clear the link they see 
between defense of the unborn and bans on human enhancement. 
 
"The uniqueness of human nature is at stake. Human dignity is indivisible: the aged, the 
sick, the very young, those with genetic diseases—every human being is possessed of an 
equal dignity; any threat to the dignity of one is a threat to us all…at every stage of life 
and in every condition of dependency they are intrinsically valuable and deserving of full 
moral respect. "  
- "Manifesto on Biotechnology and Human Dignity" 
 
It is therefore no surprise to see common cause being made between pro-choice leftist opponents 
of human enhancement and anti-abortion activists around their common ideology of human-
racism. 
 
Beyond Human Nature: The Need a Broad Normative Range for Acceptable Human 
Enhancement 
 
In conclusion, I am not arguing for a laissez-faire approach to nanotechnology or human 
enhancement, unfettered by moral analysis and political regulation. It would be immoral, and 
perhaps suicidal, for liberal democracies to be indifferent to the directions in which human beings 
might evolve using human enhancement technologies. But the concept of a unitary and inviolate 
human nature is fundamentally the wrong place to start in the analysis of which aspects of human 
life we want to preserve, suppress or extend. Rather we need to make clear that it is our capacities 
for consciousness, feeling, reason, communication, growth, and empathy, all of which we share to 
a greater or lesser extent with other animals, which we are willing to use our technologies and the 
agencies of our collective suasion – legislation, regulation, social norms and economic incentives 
– to encourage. It is greed, hatred, ignorance, violence, sickness and death which we wish to 
discourage, whether part of human nature or not. 
 
Yes, as a part of that project, we must take account of the insights of neuroscience and 
evolutionary psychology, even if the efforts to mold them into a natural law is wrong-headed and 
flawed. Understanding the way our genetic constitution shapes our thought and behavior is 
essential if we want to use human enhancement technology to improve the human condition, and 
pursue moral goals that were impossible before human enhancement. So I will close with Peter 
Singer's closing thought in his essay A Darwinian Left  (2000), which argues that the Left must 
accept that utopian projects have indeed crashed on the shoals of intractable innate human 
characteristics. But, he says, "there may be a prospect for restoring more far-reaching ambitions 
of change. We do not know to what extent our capacity to reason can, in the long run, take us 
beyond the conventional Darwinian constraints on the degree of altruism that a society may be 
able to foster" (Singer, 2000). I hope, with universal access to human enhancement technologies, 
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